Anxiety about wiretapping

Anxiety about wiretapping

INDEX TERMS Privacy|wiretapping, technological advances, need for legal guidelines;Police|wiretapping, technological advances, need for legal guidelines;

DATE 14-Aug-99

WORDS 692

Governments all over the world are going to have to come clean about how they snoop on their citizens. Britain shows how not to do it

ALL states spy on their citizens. With the latest miniature listening and video devices, it has become easy to do so. The Echelon project, a grid of listening posts linked to super-computers operated by Britain and by America’s National Security Agency, is reported to be able to detect key words in every fax, e-mail and telephone call made within the European Union. Modern policing is increasingly dependent on telephone taps and bugs. But as eavesdropping technology develops, so the need for a clear legal structure and accountability becomes more urgent.
In Japan this week a row over a bill which would allow the police to tap phones was threatening to bring down the government. Although some of the heat of the Japanese dispute centred around parliamentary procedure, concerns about an over-mighty state loomed large.
Britain has not yet had a row about wiretapping. But it should. This week a consultation period on the latest government paper on the subject, “Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom”, came to a close. It makes the case that modern developments such as e-mail and pagers require changes in the law. But it does little to address the lack of clarity, accountability and judicial oversight which are the characteristics of the current British regime (see ).
That is particularly inexcusable, since there are now plenty of examples of good practice available internationally. In the United States, federal law prohibits the interception of all communications whether “by wire, oral or electronic” unless authorised by judicial warrant. In Australia, bugging and phone tapping are regulated separately but priority is given in both sets of legislation to individual privacy. In Denmark individuals whose phones have been tapped are notified within 14 days of the expiry of the warrant unless to do so would harm the detection of crime. New Zealand and Australia require publication of detailed information on the cost of tapping operations, the categories of crime involved and statistics on its effectiveness. Even in Japan, it is proposed that all interceptions should have to be approved by judicial warrant.
Although Britain’s Labour government claims to be committed to being more open, its current efforts are feeble and riddled with anomalies. Different laws cover the tapping of phones and the placing of other forms of listening devices with different systems of control and authorisation. A telephone tap requires a warrant signed not by a judge but by a minister. But the placing of a bug can be authorised in urgent cases simply by a senior policeman.
The British bugging and phone tapping laws are so riddled with technical holes that they provide little guarantee that an individual’s privacy will not be wrongfully invaded. Satellite, mobile, cordless and international phone conversations are routinely intercepted without a warrant. The appeal process is also badly flawed. There are no oral hearings and reasoned decisions are not provided.
This anomalous situation threatens to give wiretapping a bad name. That would be a shame, since the technique does yield results. Britain’s home secretary, Jack Straw, points out that during 1996 and 1997, phone taps by police and customs led to 1,200 arrests, and the seizure of nearly three tonnes of Class A drugs, such as heroin and cocaine.
Yet results alone cannot justify a free-for-all. Nor is concern restricted to individual states. The ability of the United States, Britain and probably other countries to tap into almost any international call, fax or e-mail is unconstrained. But state intrusion into an individual’s privacy can be justified only if it has a clear basis in statute and the methods used are essential to combat serious crime or threats to national security. Electronic surveillance must be subject to rigorous control including independent oversight and an effective appeals procedure. And the right to a fair trial must not be put in peril. The gap between these principles and what is happening internationally is already large. The danger is that as the technology develops, it will become even larger.

			Anxiety about wiretapping

	INDEX TERMS		Privacy\|wiretapping, technological advances, need for legal guidelines;Police\|wiretapping, technological advances, need for legal guidelines;
	DATE		14-Aug-99
	WORDS		692

			Governments all over the world are going to have to come clean about how they snoop on their citizens. Britain shows how not to do it ALL states spy on their citizens. With the latest miniature listening and video devices, it has become easy to do so. The Echelon project, a grid of listening posts linked to super-computers operated by Britain and by America’s National Security Agency, is reported to be able to detect key words in every fax, e-mail and telephone call made within the European Union. Modern policing is increasingly dependent on telephone taps and bugs. But as eavesdropping technology develops, so the need for a clear legal structure and accountability becomes more urgent. In Japan this week a row over a bill which would allow the police to tap phones was threatening to bring down the government. Although some of the heat of the Japanese dispute centred around parliamentary procedure, concerns about an over-mighty state loomed large. Britain has not yet had a row about wiretapping. But it should. This week a consultation period on the latest government paper on the subject, “Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom”, came to a close. It makes the case that modern developments such as e-mail and pagers require changes in the law. But it does little to address the lack of clarity, accountability and judicial oversight which are the characteristics of the current British regime (see ). That is particularly inexcusable, since there are now plenty of examples of good practice available internationally. In the United States, federal law prohibits the interception of all communications whether “by wire, oral or electronic” unless authorised by judicial warrant. In Australia, bugging and phone tapping are regulated separately but priority is given in both sets of legislation to individual privacy. In Denmark individuals whose phones have been tapped are notified within 14 days of the expiry of the warrant unless to do so would harm the detection of crime. New Zealand and Australia require publication of detailed information on the cost of tapping operations, the categories of crime involved and statistics on its effectiveness. Even in Japan, it is proposed that all interceptions should have to be approved by judicial warrant. Although Britain’s Labour government claims to be committed to being more open, its current efforts are feeble and riddled with anomalies. Different laws cover the tapping of phones and the placing of other forms of listening devices with different systems of control and authorisation. A telephone tap requires a warrant signed not by a judge but by a minister. But the placing of a bug can be authorised in urgent cases simply by a senior policeman. The British bugging and phone tapping laws are so riddled with technical holes that they provide little guarantee that an individual’s privacy will not be wrongfully invaded. Satellite, mobile, cordless and international phone conversations are routinely intercepted without a warrant. The appeal process is also badly flawed. There are no oral hearings and reasoned decisions are not provided. This anomalous situation threatens to give wiretapping a bad name. That would be a shame, since the technique does yield results. Britain’s home secretary, Jack Straw, points out that during 1996 and 1997, phone taps by police and customs led to 1,200 arrests, and the seizure of nearly three tonnes of Class A drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. Yet results alone cannot justify a free-for-all. Nor is concern restricted to individual states. The ability of the United States, Britain and probably other countries to tap into almost any international call, fax or e-mail is unconstrained. But state intrusion into an individual’s privacy can be justified only if it has a clear basis in statute and the methods used are essential to combat serious crime or threats to national security. Electronic surveillance must be subject to rigorous control including independent oversight and an effective appeals procedure. And the right to a fair trial must not be put in peril. The gap between these principles and what is happening internationally is already large. The danger is that as the technology develops, it will become even larger.